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Abstract
Computational social science studies often
contextualize content analysis within standard
demographics. Since demographics are un-
available on many social media platforms (e.g.
Twitter) numerous studies have inferred demo-
graphics automatically. Despite many studies
presenting proof of concept inference of race
and ethnicity, training of practical systems re-
mains elusive since there are few annotated
datasets. Existing datasets are small, inaccu-
rate, or fail to cover the four most common
racial and ethnic groups in the United States.
We present a method to identify self-reports of
race and ethnicity from Twitter profile descrip-
tions. Despite errors inherent in automated su-
pervision, we produce models with good per-
formance when measured on gold standard
self-report survey data. The result is a repro-
ducible method for creating large-scale train-
ing resources for race and ethnicity.
1 Introduction
Contextualization of population studies with de-
mographics forms a central analysis method
within the social sciences. Standard demographic
panels in telephone surveys across political sci-
ence, public health and other domains enable anal-
ysis of sub-population opinions and trends. Demo-
graphics such as age, gender, race/ethnicity and lo-
cation often serve as proxies for important socio-
cultural groups. As the social sciences increas-
ingly rely on computational analyses of online text
data, limitations imposed by a lack of availabil-
ity of demographic attributes hinder comparison of
these studies to traditional methods (Burger et al.,
2011).
Computational social science increasingly
utilizes methods for the automatic inference
∗Equal contribution
of demographic attributes from social me-
dia, such as Twitter (Burger et al., 2011;
Pennacchiotti and Popescu, 2011). Demographic
attributes have been included in social media
studies in varied domains, such as health, politics,
and linguistics (Dos Reis and Culotta, 2015;
O’Connor et al., 2010; Eisenstein et al., 2014).
Off-the-shelf software packages support the
inference of gender and location (Knowles et al.,
2016; Dredze et al., 2013; Rahimi et al., 2016).
Unlike age or geolocation, race and ethnic-
ity are sociocultural categories with compet-
ing definitions and measurement approaches
(Comstock et al., 2004; Vargas and Stainback,
2016; Culley, 2006). Despite this complexity,
understanding race and ethnicity is crucial for
public health research (Dressler et al., 2005).
Analyses that explore mental health on Twit-
ter (Loveys et al., 2018) should consider racial dis-
parities in healthcare (Satcher, 2001; Amir et al.,
2019) or online interactions (Delisle et al., 2019a;
Burnap and Williams, 2016). Despite the impor-
tance of race and ethnicity in these studies, and
multiple proof-of-concept classification studies,
there are no readily-available systems that can
infer demographics for the most common United
States racial/ethnic groups. This gap arises from
major limitations for all publicly-available data
resources.
A large, high-quality dataset for this task has
several desiderata. First, it should cover enough
categories to match standard demographics pan-
els. Second, the dataset must be sufficiently large
to support training accurate systems. Third, the
dataset should be reproducible; Twitter datasets
shrink over time as users delete or restrict ac-
counts, and models become less useful due to do-
main drift (Huang and Paul, 2018).
We present a method for automatically con-
structing a large Twitter dataset for race and eth-
Citation Annotation %Missing # Users % W % B %H/L % A
Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al. (2015) Survey 4.7 3572 80.8 9.5 6.1 3.6
Culotta et al. (2015) Crowdsourced 60.0 308 50.0 19.5 30.5 0
Volkova and Bachrach (2015) Crowdsourced 36.5 3174 48.0 35.8 8.9 3.0
Total Matching Users Self-report - 2.50M 26.8 53.8 11.3 8.1
Query-Bigram Self-report 8.1 112k 51.2 40.8 1.4 6.6
Heuristic-Filter Self-report 40.6 135k 42.2 45.9 5.6 6.4
Balanced-Group-Person Self-report 0.0 31k 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Table 1: Previously-published Twitter datasets annotated for race/ethnicity and datasets collected in this work. “%
Missing” shows the percent of users that could not be scraped in 2019. “# Users” shows the number users that are
currently available. Per-group percentages (White, Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Asian) are from non-missing data.
nicity. Keyword-matching selects a high recall
large corpus of Twitter users who potentially self-
identify a racial or ethnic group, building on past
work that considered self-reports (Beller et al.,
2014; Coppersmith et al., 2014). We then learn
a set of filters to improve precision by remov-
ing users who match keywords but do not self-
report their demographics. Our approach can be
automatically repeated in the future to update the
dataset. While our automatic supervision is inher-
ently noisy – self-descriptions are hard to iden-
tify and potentially unreliable – our large dataset
provides much better training data than previous
crowdsourced dataset. We validate this compar-
ison on a gold-standard survey dataset of self-
reported labels (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Ungar, 2018).
We release our code in the DEMOGRAPHER repos-
itory.1 We will release our collected datasets and
trained models to researchers with approval from
an IRB or similar ethics board, contingent on com-
pliance with our data usage agreement.
2 Ethical Concerns and Considerations
Complexities of racial identity raise ethical consid-
erations, requiring discussion of the benefits and
harms of this work (Benton et al., 2017).
The benefits of such research are clear. Con-
sider public health, with the goal of prevent-
ing disease and improving the overall health of
the population. Numerous studies have used so-
cial media data to derive insights on health be-
haviors and to support health-based interventions
(Paul and Dredze, 2011; Sinnenberg et al., 2017;
Paul and Dredze, 2017). These methods have
transformed areas of public health which previ-
ously lacked accessible data (Ayers et al., 2014).
Aligning social media with traditional data sources
requires demographics.
1
https://bitbucket.org/mdredze/demographer
Concerns and potential harms are more
complex. Ongoing discussions concern
the need for informed consent from so-
cial media users (Fiesler and Proferes, 2018;
Marwick and boyd, 2011). Twitter’s privacy
policy states that the company “make[s] public
data on Twitter available to the world,” but many
users may not be aware of the scope or nature of
research conducted using their data (Mikal et al.,
2016). Participant consent must be informed,
and we should seek to understand users’ com-
prehension of terms of service when conducting
possibly-sensitive research. Applying established
human subjects research regulations, IRBs have
ruled that passive monitoring of social media data
falls under public data exemptions.
The ability to identify user demographics could
be used maliciously, such as to track or intimi-
date minority groups. However, abuse and dis-
crimination is already widespread, even without
automated demographics tools. Recent work has
show that women on Twitter, especially journalists
and politicians, receive disproportionate amounts
of abuse (Delisle et al., 2019b). On Facebook,
advertisers have used the platform’s knowledge
of users’ racial identities to illegally discriminate
when posting job or housing ads (Benner et al.,
2019; Angwin and Parris Jr, 2016). To protect
against misuse of our work, we follow Twitter’s
developer terms which prohibit efforts to “target,
segment, or profile individuals” based on several
sensitive categories, including racial or ethnic ori-
gin and create a data use agreement described be-
low.
Another concern of any predictive model for
sensitive traits is that a descriptive model could be
interpreted as a prescriptive assessment (Ho et al.,
2015). To prevent a model’s errors from sup-
porting essentialist frameworks for complex demo-
graphic traits, predictions should not be analyzed
for individual users. Additionally, our datasets and
models do not cover smaller racial minorities (e.g.
Pacific Islander) or the many fine-grained com-
plexities of mixed-race demographic identities; we
do not imply that those complexities do not exist,
but that current methods are insufficient for ana-
lyzing them.
Finally, we distinguish between biased mod-
els and biased applications. Our models are far
from perfect; for some analyses their error rates
may be too high to draw conclusions. For exam-
ple, we could use our models to analyze whether
vaccine opinions on Twitter differ between racial
groups (Quinn et al., 2019). If we only analyze a
small sample of users and our models have high
error rates, differences that appear significant may
be an artifact of the models’ imperfections. Thus,
when using these tools it is essential to account for
uncertainty to avoid unfounded conclusions.
On the whole, we believe demographic tools
provide significant benefits that justify the poten-
tial risks in their development. We make our data
available to other researchers, but with limitations.
We require that researchers comply with a data
use agreement and obtain approval by an IRB or
similar ethics committee. Our agreement restricts
these tools to population-level analyses2 and not
the analysis of individual users. We exclude cer-
tain applications, such as targeting of individuals
based on race or ethnicity. Any future research
that makes demographically-contextualized con-
clusions from classifier predictions must explic-
itly consider ethical trade-offs specific to its appli-
cation. Finally, our analysis of social media for
public health research has been IRB reviewed and
deemed exempt (45 CFR 46.101(b)(4)).
3 Datasets for Race and Ethnicity
Our tools and analysis focus on the United
States, where recognized racial categories
have varied over time (Hirschman et al., 2000;
Lee and Tafoya, 2006). Current US census – and
many surveys – recording self-reported racial cat-
egories as White, Black, American Indian, Asian,
and Pacific Islander. Ethnicity ask if the individual
is of Hispanic/Latinx origin or not, however, there
is not necessarily a clear distinction between race
and ethnicity (Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez,
2Aggregate analyses of content is explicitly supported by
Twitter’s restricted uses of APIs.
2015; Campbell and Rogalin, 2006;
Cornell and Hartmann, 2006). Individuals
may identify as both a race and an ethnic-
ity, and 2% of Americans identify as multi-
racial (Jones and Smith, 2001). Because of the
limited data availability, we only consider the four
largest race/ethnicity groups, which we model
as mutually exclusive: White, Black, Asian, and
Hispanic/Latinx. Our methodology is flexible to
a more comprehensive choice, but we do not yet
have the means to validate more fine-grained or
intersectional approaches.
Table 1 (top) lists previously published datasets
for race/ethnicity. While each dataset has been
used for training, each has drawbacks that limit
their value for downstream applications. Since
only user ids can be shared, user account deletions
over time cause substantial missing data (e.g. no
Asian users remain for Culotta et al. (2015)).
There have been a variety of approaches used
to create annotated datasets for demographics.
Culotta et al. (2015) and Volkova and Bachrach
(2015) relied on manual annotation, noting inter-
annotator agreement estimated at 80% and Co-
hen’s κ of 0.71, respectively. Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al.
(2015) conducted a survey to collect self-reported
demographics. Pennacchiotti and Popescu (2011)
automatically label African American users using
profile mentions, but their data is not publicly
available.
Crowdsourced annotation assumes that racial
identity can be accurately perceived by others, an
assumption that has serious flaws for gender and
age (Flekova et al., 2016; Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al.,
2017). Rule-based or statistical systems for data
collection can be effective (Burger et al., 2011;
Chang et al., 2010), but raise concerns about se-
lection bias: if we only label users who take
a certain action, a model trained on those users
may not generalize to users who do not take that
action (Wood-Doughty et al., 2017). Explicitly
querying for demographics in a survey provides a
gold-standard, but yields small or skewed datasets
due to survey expense (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Ungar,
2018).
We take a hybrid approach: automated super-
vision from racial self-identification and minimal
manual annotation to refine our dataset labels.
This forms an automated pipeline that can be re-
run to update the datasets. We measure label qual-
ity via an experimental evaluation in § 5.
Raw Color Plural Bigram Quote All
Precision 76.74 78.57 76.74 82.50 78.57 86.84
Removed
by filter
- 314k 212k 281k 4k 784k
Table 2: Applying our four HF filters (§ 4) individually
and altogether. Precision is calculated on our manually-
annotated dev set from Appendix B, after thresholding
on self-report score.
4 Data Collection of Self-Reports
We construct a regular expression for terms
associated with racial identity. We select tweets
from Twitter’s 1% sample from July 2011 to
July 2019 in which the user’s profile description
contains one of the following racial keywords:
black, african-american, white,
caucasian, asian, hispanic,
latin, latina, latino, latinx.
While there are other terms that signify racial
identity, these match common survey pan-
els (Hirschman et al., 2000) and our empirical
evaluation is limited because our survey dataset
only covers four classes. We omit self-reports that
indicate a country of origin (e.g. ‘Colombian’ or
‘Chinese-American’), smaller racial minorities
(e.g. ‘Native American’ or ‘two or more races’),
or more ambiguous slang terms. We leave
additional categories to future work.
For users who appear multiple times, we
consider their latest descriptions. We process
matching tweets by recursively searching the
“retweeted status” and “quoted status” fields to ex-
tract additional profile descriptions that contain a
query keyword.
We select users whose profile descriptions con-
tain a query keyword, which heavily skews to-
wards color terms (‘white’, ‘black’). This pro-
duces 2.67M users, 2.50M of which match exactly
one racial/ethnic class (Table 1, ‘Total Matching
Users’). While this is several orders of magni-
tude larger than existing datasets, many user de-
scriptions that match racial keywords are not racial
self-reports. We next consider approaches to fil-
ter these users’ profile descriptions to obtain three
self-report datasets of different sizes and preci-
sions.
For all three datasets, we use a model that as-
signs a ‘self-report’ score based on the likelihood
that a profile contains a self-report. We then use
a binary cutoff to only include users with a high
enough self-report score. We obtain this score by
leveraging lexical co-occurrence, an important cue
for word associations (Spence and Owens, 1990;
Church and Hanks, 1990). We combine relative
frequencies of co-occurring words within a fixed
window, weighed by distance between query and
co-occurring self-report words. For example, if
“farmer” is a self-report word, then “Black farmer”
should score higher than “Black beans farmer”
since the query and self-report word are closer.
We choose the window size and threshold for this
score function on a manually-labeled tuning set,
after which our scoring function achieves 72.4%
accuracy on a manually-labeled test set. These hy-
perparameter details are described in Appendix B.
Our first dataset selects users with a bigram
containing a racial keyword followed by a ‘person
keyword.’ Our person keywords are: man,
woman, person, individual, guy,
gal, boy, girl, so this method matches
users with descriptions containing bigrams such
as “Black woman” or “Asian guy.” We expect this
method to have high precision, but it has extreme
label imbalance; 91% of the users are labeled
as either white or black. From the Twitter 1%
sample, this dataset contains 122k users, but only
112k users could be re-scraped in 2019. We refer
to this dataset as Query-Bigram (QB).
As the QB dataset contains only 112k users, we
now consider a less restrictive approach. Our sec-
ond dataset uses four heuristic filters applied to the
original 2.67M users that discard common false
positives. First, many non-self-report descriptions
matched “black” and “white” in addition to other
colors, so we filtered out all words from a color-
list (Berlin and Kay, 1991). Second, as racial key-
words followed by plural nouns were unlikely to
be self-reports (e.g. “white people”) we used
NLTK TweetTokenizer (Bird et al., 2009) to
obtain part-of-speech tags and filter out these ex-
amples. Third, we curate a list of bigrams that fre-
quently contain a query but are unlikely to be self-
reports (e.g. “black sheep,”).3 This produces an
intersection of 286 non-self-report bigrams, which
we filter out. Finally, we ignore query words that
appear inside quotation marks. Table 2 shows pre-
cision and dataset size change as we apply each
filter individually and all filters together. Apply-
ing all four filters gives a total of 1.72M users,
3 Using Google N-grams that appear at least 100k times
(Michel et al., 2011).
and after thresholding on the self-report score, this
dataset is reduced to 228k users. Of these, only
135k users could be scraped in 2019. We call this
dataset Heuristic-Filtered (HF).
Both the QB and HF datasets are highly class-
imbalanced. Our third dataset is designed to
have equal representation across all four classes.
Across both our QB and HF datasets we have only
7,756 Hispanic/Latinx users that we could scrape
in 2019, making it our smallest demographic class.
We thus use our self-report scores to select the
highest-scoring 7,756 users from each of the other
three demographic classes, producing a balanced
dataset of 31k users. We call this group Class-
Balanced (CB).
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now conduct an empirical evaluation of our
noisy self-report datasets. If training on our
datasets produces a high quality model, then our
method for dataset construction yields a repeatable
method to support training of demographic infer-
ence systems. We will train supervised classifiers
on our datasets, and on existing datasets, and com-
pare the resulting performance on a variety of eval-
uation sets.
We divide the six datasets described in Ta-
ble 1 into training, dev, and test sets. We will
use the gold-standard self-report survey data from
Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al. (2015) as our held-out test
set for evaluating all models. We combine the
crowdsourced data from Volkova and Bachrach
(2015) and (Culotta et al., 2015) into a single
dataset containing 3.5k users, which we then split
60%/40% to create a training and development set.
This dev set is used for all models. The training set
is our baseline comparison, referred to as Crowd
in our results tables. We also create class-balanced
versions of the dev and test sets with 168 and 452
users, respectively. Finally, we use each of our
three collected datasets (QB, HF, CB) as train-
ing sets, and use a combination of each with the
Crowd training set. Thus in total, we have seven
training datasets, which make up the bottom seven
rows of our results in Table 3. Table 3 shows mod-
els evaluation on imbalanced dev and test sets on
the left and balanced, sub-sampled evaluation on
the right.
5.1 Demographic Prediction Models
We consider two demographic inference models
which we train on each training set. The first fol-
lows Wood-Doughty et al. (2018) and uses a sin-
gle tweet per user. The model inputs the user’s
name into a character-based convolutional neural
network (CNN) and combines the learned repre-
sentation with features from the profile metadata,
such as the user’s verification status and ratio of
followers to friends. These features are passed
through a two-layer MLP to produce a distribution
over the label classes. This model is referred to as
‘Names’ in Table 3.
The second model from Volkova and Bachrach
(2015) constructs unigram features from a user’s
tweet history (up to 200 tweets) in a logistic re-
gression classifier. We include as features the 77k
non-stopword unigrams that occur at least twice in
the development set. We download up to the 200
most recent tweets for each user from the Twitter
API. This model is referred to as ‘Unigrams’ in
Table 3.
For both models we tune hyperparameters us-
ing the crowdsourced dev set. Training details for
both models are shown in Appendix C, and their
implementation is in our released code.
5.2 Evaluation and Baselines
We consider multiple evaluation setups to explore
the extreme class imbalance of the survey and
crowdsourced datasets (Table 1). First, we eval-
uate both total accuracy and macro-averaged F1
score, which penalizes poor performance on less-
frequent classes. Second, we separately evaluate
tuning and testing our models on either imbal-
anced or balanced dev and test sets, to see how it
affects per-class classifier accuracy. Third, we con-
sider a method for adapting to class-distribution
differences between the training and test datasets.
After training our models, we use the dev set to
estimate the per-class precision and recall of our
classifier, and then use a greedy approach to tweak
classifier thresholds to maximize test set accuracy.
The details of this rebalancing approach are in Ap-
pendix D.
We also show the performance of two naı¨ve
strategies: randomly guessing across the four de-
mographic categories, and deterministically guess-
ing the majority category. These baselines high-
light the tradeoffs between accuracy and F1. Be-
cause the imbalanced test set is so imbalanced, the
Imbalanced prediction Balanced prediction
Names Unigrams Names Unigrams
Dataset/Baseline F1 Acc % F1 Acc % Dataset/Baseline F1 Acc % F1 Acc %
Random .250 25.0 .250 25.0 Random .250 25.0 .250 25.0
Majority .224 80.8 .224 80.8 Majority .100 25.0 .100 25.0
Crowd .264 78.4 .372 83.5 Crowd .177 28.6 .252 36.3
QB .325 80.5 .352 84.2 QB .282 33.3 .277 39.4
Crowd+QB .314 79.9 .368 83.9 Crowd+QB .293 34.8 .245 33.4
HF .323 78.7 .357 84.3 HF .274 35.5 .262 35.6
Crowd+HF .233 78.1 .345 83.9 Crowd+HF .139 25.1 .260 38.9
CB .339 65.9 .396 82.9 CB .367 36.8 .409 45.1
Crowd+CB .319 57.8 .422 84.0 Crowd+CB .360 37.0 .424 46.9
Table 3: Experimental results for baseline methods, models trained on the crowdsourced datasets, and models
trained on our self-report datasets. The best result in each column is in bold. Dataset abbreviations are defined in
§ 4. ‘+’ indicates a combined dataset of crowdsourced data plus our self-report data. Section 5 and Appendix C
contain the training and evaluation details.
‘Majority’ baseline strategy can achieve high over-
all accuracy, but very low F1. The Random base-
line will have low overall accuracy but slightly bet-
ter F1 than the Majority strategy. These two base-
lines provide the first two rows of Tables 3.
We stress these evaluation details because the
class-imbalance may have serious implications for
downstream applications. Models trained to do
well on the majority class at the expense of mi-
nority classes could bias downstream analyses by
under-representing minority groups. In public
health applications with disparities between major-
ity and minority groups (LaVeist, 2005), not ac-
counting for imbalances between the training and
test datasets could exacerbate rather than amelio-
rate inequalities.
6 Experimental Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the results for each model and
dataset. Unsurprisingly, the many-tweet Unigrams
model outperformed the single-tweet Names
model in both F1 and accuracy across multiple
datasets. This is consistent with past published
work; the Unigrams model has much more data
per user than the Names model.
In the imbalanced evaluations, we see a large
trade-off between accuracy and F1, as the mod-
els can achieve better overall accuracy when
they learn to ignore the smaller Asian and His-
panic/Latinx classes. In particular, the trivial ‘Ma-
jority’ baseline achieves better accuracy but the
worst F1 compared to any single-tweet Namemod-
els.
For the many-tweet Unigrams model, our CB
dataset, which is explicitly designed to learn a
model that does not ignore any of the four demo-
graphic labels, achieves the best F1 scores in both
the imbalanced and balanced evaluations, and the
best accuracy in the balanced evaluations. In many
cases, a combination of our self-report datasets
and crowdsourced datasets does better than our
data alone. On the balanced evaluation sets, mod-
els trained with our collected datasets obtain im-
provements of up to 10.6% accuracy and .172 F1
over models trained only on the Crowd dataset.
To further explore the tradeoffs between accu-
racy and F1, we also show the per-class accuracy
of our classifiers in Table 8a, as well as the confu-
sion matrix of our classifier outputs in Table 7 in
the appendix. We see that in the imbalanced evalu-
ation, accuracy on the majority (White) class com-
pletely dominates the model’s performance. Using
balanced train, dev, and test datasets, however, lets
us balance classifier accuracy across classes.
These empirical results validate the quality of
our self-report datasets. While the self-reports are
noisy, our collected datasets are large enough that
they support better demographic inference models
on held-out, gold-standard labels. Despite this ex-
perimental improvement, in a real-world applica-
tion a researcher may need more accurate classi-
fiers in order to draw conclusions from a particular
dataset, or may wish to adjust the training dataset
to prioritize classifiers with high precision or recall
for particular demographic groups. Such research
requires a careful contextualization of what con-
clusions can be drawn from the available data and
models; differences between groups may be under-
or over-exaggerated by classifier errors.
7 Twitter Behaviors across Groups
Our experimental results demonstrate that our
noisy self-report data, in aggregate, offers better
predictive power than a smaller dataset of human-
labeled data. However, these classification results
do not provide insights about how self-reporting
users use Twitter. Do the different demographic
groups in our dataset empirically differ in the top-
ics they discuss or way they construct their pro-
files? Are users’ propensity to use self-report key-
words in profile descriptions independent of other
ways in which they use Twitter?
We explore these questions using a variety
of quantitative analyses of Twitter user behav-
ior, following similarly-motivated public health re-
search that has analyzed hashtag and emoji usage
or linguistic features (Coppersmith et al., 2014;
Homan et al., 2014; Gkotsis et al., 2016). There
are two different interpretations to keep in mind
when considering these group-level differences.
On the one hand, the Twitter user behaviors we
measure may correlate with demographic cate-
gories (Wood-Doughty et al., 2017). However, it
may also be that the behavior of self-reporting cor-
relates with these behaviors, and thus our selec-
tion technique introduces bias. These can both be
true, and our current methods cannot distinguish
between them. While our empirical evaluation
shows that our data is still useful for training clas-
sifiers to predict gold-standard labels, questions
of selection effects are important when evaluating
possible real-world applications.
List-based Features We first seek to under-
stand topical differences between groups in our
collected datasets, by compiling a ranked list
of common emojis, emoticons, and part-of-
speech tags within each group. We also use
a SAGE (Eisenstein et al., 2011) lexical vari-
ation implementation to find the words that
most distinguish each demographic group, fol-
lowing Monroe et al. (2008). To compare
across groups, we look at the top k items in
each list and calculate Kendall τ rank correla-
tion coefficients for each pair of demographic
groups (Morstatter et al., 2013). The table of pair-
wise Kendall τ calculations is in Table 5. These
coefficients vary between -1 for a perfect negative
correlation and 1 for a perfect positive correlation.
For emojis and emoticons, all correlations are neg-
ative for smaller k values, but they tend in a pos-
itive direction as we increase k. Despite this gen-
eral trend, we see strong differences in content us-
age between groups. For hashtags, in particular,
correlations are strongly negative for all values of
k, suggesting that groups labeled by our method
substantially differ in the topics they discuss. As a
qualitative look at topical differences, we show the
top-five SAGE keywords for each group in Table 4.
While our initial data collection keywords are all
in English, we do not make an attempt to limit
our analysis to English-language speakers. Thus,
topic differences may be confounded by native lan-
guage(s).
Quantitative Linguistic Features Lexical fea-
tures are widely used for classifying users on Twit-
ter (Pennacchiotti and Popescu, 2011; Rao et al.,
2010; Blodgett et al., 2016). To understand
possible linguistic differences between collected
groups, we follow §3.1 of Inuwa-Dutse et al.
(2018) and for each user in our group, we cal-
culate Type-Token Ratio (TTR), Lexical Diver-
sity (Tweedie and Baayen, 1998), and the propor-
tion of English contractions they use. TTR is de-
fined as the number of unique tokens in a tweet
divided by the total number of tokens in the tweet.
We compute lexical diversity as the total number
of tokens in a tweet without URLs, user mentions
and stopwords divided by the total number of to-
kens in the tweet. A comparison of the mean of
each quantitative linguistic features are in Table 4.
To explore differences between groups us-
ing previously-trained linguistic models, we con-
sider quantitative models for evaluating for-
mality (Pavlick and Tetreault, 2016) and polite-
ness (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2013) of on-
line text. The formality score is estimated with
a regression model over lexical and syntactic fea-
tures including n-grams, dependency parse, and
word embeddings. We use the implementation
released by the authors.4 The linguistically-
informed politeness classifier considers unigram
features, as well as multiple politeness strategies
including lexicons for gratitude and positive or
negative sentiment. We use the implementation
4
https://github.com/YahooArchive/formality-classifier
# Users LD CPT TTR HPT Formality Politeness Top SAGE Keywords
A 9442 0.751 0.075 0.533 0.155∗ -1.770 0.4595 liked, visit, hahaha, art, youtube
B 70838 0.747 0.067 0.532 0.096† -1.750 0.4584 avrillavigne, ni**as, black, ni**a, wit
H/L 8349 0.731 0.051 0.563 0.145∗ -1.802 0.4609 justinbieber, justin, online, follow, unfollower
W 57724 0.759 0.085 0.510 0.081† -1.697 0.4614 bc, realdonaldtrump, snapchat, dog, holy
Table 4: Comparison of the mean values for each numerical feature between groups. The last column has the
top keywords per group as differentiating according to the SAGE model. Methods are described in § 7. Abbre-
viations: LD, Lexical Diversity; CPT, Contractions per tweet; TTR, Type-Token Ratio; HPT, Hashtags per tweet.
Almost all differences are significant. Within each column, only numbers with a shared superscript symbol are not
significantly different at a 0.05 confidence level when using a Mann-Whitney U test.
Emojis Emoticons Hashtags PoS bigrams
Top k 20 50 80 20 50 20 50 80 20 50 80
A vs. B -0.67 -0.26 -0.05 -0.19 0.10 -0.85 -0.87 -0.86 0.29 0.19 0.79
A vs. H/L -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.84 -0.86 -0.86 0.55 0.02 0.58
A vs. W -0.38 0.13 0.04 -0.09 0.26 -0.83 -0.80 -0.75 0.02 -0.02 0.56
B vs. H/L -0.65 -0.38 -0.09 -0.31 0.03 -0.83 -0.82 -0.83 0.52 0.03 0.56
B vs. W -0.48 -0.16 0.16 -0.18 0.30 -0.79 -0.72 -0.69 0.04 0.24 0.68
H/L vs. W -0.40 -0.13 -0.01 -0.07 0.19 -0.91 -0.89 -0.87 -0.17 -0.28 -0.16
Table 5: Kendall’s τ correlation coefficients for top items of different list features.
Asian Black Hispanic/Latinx White Random
% users in dataset 6.71 49.44 5.83 38.02 –
(m) % tweets from Android sources 24.37∗† 25.34∗‡ 23.96†‡ 16.57 30.5
(m) % tweets from iPhone sources 46.15 47.56 40.88 64.98 36.9
(m) % tweets from iPad sources 1.46 1.07 1.40∗ 1.29∗ –
(m) % tweets from desktop web 10.23 7.29∗ 13.21 6.09∗ 9.0
% users with 1+ tweets from Android 38.95∗† 38.33∗ 39.41† 25.46 –
% users with 1+ tweets from iPhone 60.28 58.21 54.89 75.37 –
% users with 1+ tweets from Desktop 43.34 30.59 44.87 31.04 –
% users with profile URL 34.09∗ 29.71 34.75∗ 24.78 20.8
% users with custom profile image 98.83 99.29∗† 99.24∗‡ 99.33†‡ 95.4
% users with geotagging enabled 48.65∗ 53.27 49.54∗ 56.04 33.1
% users with 1+ geotagged tweet 8.35∗ 6.46 7.81∗ 5.43 7.9
Average statuses count 11974 18709 12449 14177 –
Average tweets per month 177.83 255.41 182.13 200.85 739
(m) % tweets that mention a user 59.73 58.71 60.44∗ 61.77∗ 22.3
(m) % tweets that include an image 20.44∗ 17.20 18.39 19.17∗ 33.9
(m) % tweets that include a URL 20.99 21.64 24.01 17.22 –
Table 6: Profile Behavioral Features. The first four columns are from users collected in our HF dataset, the
fifth column gives a comparison to a random sample of 1M users reported in (Wood-Doughty et al., 2017), when
available. (m) indicates that a percent or average was computed via micro-averaging across users’ tweets; all
others are macro-averaged across users. Almost all differences in a row are statistically significant from one
another, according to a Mann-Whitney U Test. However, if two entries in the same row share a superscript symbol,
they are not significantly different at a 0.05 confidence level. We are unable to conduct significance tests on the
data from the random sample.
released by the authors.5 For both models, we
compute the average score over all the text from
one user, and average over all the users within cer-
tain demographics group. These values are shown
in Table 4. As with list-based features, these fea-
tures may be heavily influenced by users’ native
5
https://github.com/sudhof/politeness
language(s).
Profile Behavioral Features Finally, we con-
sider a few basic measures of Twitter usage, com-
puted from the profile information of each user,
following Wood-Doughty et al. (2017). Table 6
contains the mean value of these features, describ-
ing the broad range of basic user behaviors on the
Twitter platform. Almost all differences in these
behavioral features are significant across groups.
The biggest difference appears in device usage,
where we see that White users are much more
likely to have used an iPhone to tweet and much
less likely to have used an Android to tweet, when
compared against users of the other three demo-
graphic groups.
This table also provides interesting comparisons
to prior work. Pavalanathan and Eisenstein (2015)
demonstrated that the use of Twitter geotagging
was more prevalent in metropolitan areas and
among younger users. Our construction of Ta-
ble 6 follows past work that calculated similar
profile behavior features for a random sample of
1M Twitter users in 2017 (Wood-Doughty et al.,
2017). Comparing against those numbers, we see
that across all our demographic groups, users in
our datasets are much more likely to include a cus-
tom profile image or profile URL, or to enable
geotagging on their profile. While the differences
from the random sample are substantial for most
features, the random sample may contain many
more bots or spam accounts than our collected
datasets (Morstatter et al., 2013).
Across all types of features we consider, we see
many substantial differences between the differ-
ent groups labeled by our data collection methods.
This provides strong evidence that our data collec-
tion based on description keywords is correlated
with actual underlying differences in how users in
each group use Twitter. However, it cannot re-
veal to us whether these differences are primar-
ily correlated with racial/ethnic groups, or whether
we see these differences primarily based on how
users make the decision whether to self-report
a race/ethnicity keyword. Researchers working
on downstream public health applications (e.g.
(Gkotsis et al., 2016)) may want to account for
these empirical differences between groups in our
training datasets when drawing conclusions about
users in other datasets.
8 Limitations and Future Work
We have presented a reproducible method for auto-
matically identifying self-reports of race and eth-
nicity to construct an annotated dataset for train-
ing demographic inference models. While our
automated annotations are imperfect, we show
that our data can supplement or replace manually-
annotated data. This enables the development and
distribution of tools to facilitate demographic con-
textualization in computational social science re-
search.
There are several important extensions to con-
sider. First, our analysis focuses on the United
States; most countries have a unique cultural con-
ceptualizations of race/ethnicity and unique demo-
graphic composition, and may require a country-
specific focus. Second, we cover four categories
of race/ethnicity, ignoring smaller populations and
multi-racial categories (Jones and Smith, 2001).
Third, we use a limited set of query terms, which
ignores the diversity of how people may choose
to self-report their identities. While our methods
scale easily to additional categories and/or racial
keywords, our evaluation method requires gold-
standard test set that covers those groups. Finally,
past work has highlighted various biases in demo-
graphic inference (Pavalanathan and Eisenstein,
2015; Wood-Doughty et al., 2017), and our anal-
yses cannot fully rule out the presence of such
biases in our data or models. In future work,
we strongly encourage the study of racial self-
identities and social cultural issues as supported
by computational analyses. Furthermore, these is-
sues should be considered with a global perspec-
tive, especially with regards to biases in our col-
lection methods (Landeiro and Culotta, 2016).
We will release our code and our annotated
Twitter user ids to enable comparison to our
method, the training of new models, and for the
construction of future updated datasets. Use of
our data or models will require complying with a
data use agreement and obtaining approval from
an ethics board.
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A Preprocessing, Tokenizing, and
Tagging
We lowercase all descriptions and use NLTK
Tweet Tokenizer (Bird et al., 2009) to get the
PoS tags. Our candidate self-report words are
scraped from 177M Twitter descriptions using the
regex and PoS pattern, {I‘/I a}m (+ RB)(
+ DT) (+ JJ) + NN. We collect both adjec-
tives and nouns from the pattern above, and refine
the matches by keeping adjectives and nouns that
match the majority tag in the Google N-gram cor-
pus. We filter out plural words (e.g. ‘white peo-
ple’) using a PoS tag pattern, JJ + NNPS/NNS,
and refer to our set of self-report words as S.
B Calculating the ‘Self-Report’ Score
To calculate the score described in § 4, we first
obtain simple co-occurrence weighting by count-
ing the occurrences Os(ws) of word ws as a self-
report word, and its overal occurrences O(ws).
Then:
R =
∑
ws∈S
win
1
D(ws, q)
·
Os(ws)
O(ws)
,
where Swin is the self-report words in the fixed
window size, D(ws, q) denotes the distance be-
tween ws and query word q.
We also consider a TF-IDF weighting as:
Rtfidf =
∑
ws∈S
win
1
D(ws, q)
·
Os(ws)
O(ws)
· log
∑
w∈S
Os(w)
Os(ws)
To fine-tune our self-report score, three authors
manually labeled a tuning set of 400 descriptions
as to whether the user was self-reporting a match-
ing query word, using a three-label nominal scale
of ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ and ‘unsure.’ We discarded 6 that we
classified as organizations (Wood-Doughty et al.,
2018), and had an Krippendorff α 0.8058 within
on the remaining 394. We use majority voting
strategy to get binary labels and select the self-
report score’s hyperparameters of window size and
threshold, and whether to use the tf-idf weighting,
based on the precision calculated on this tuning
set.
To ensure that these chosen hyperparameters
did not overfit to the tuning set, we sampled an
additional 199 users from the HF dataset. Us-
ing a three-label nominal scale of ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ or
W B H/L A
W 14.2 2.9 7.7 0.2
B 4.0 18.6 2.4 0.0
H/L 8.6 4.4 11.9 0.0
A 8.8 4.4 9.7 2.0
(a) Crowd+CB confusion matrix from balanced evaluation.
Rows indicate true labels, columns indicate predicted labels.
Cells show percentage of the entire dataset.
W B H/L A
W 79.5 0.8 0.9 0.2
B 5.4 3.9 0.1 0.0
H/L 5.5 0.1 0.3 0.0
A 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.3
(b) Crowd+CB confusion matrix from imbalanced evaluation.
Rows indicate true labels, columns indicate predicted labels.
Cells show percentage of the entire dataset.
Table 7: Confusion matrices from models with best F1.
’unsure,’ the three annotators achieved a Krippen-
dorff’s alpha of 0.625. After converting to binary
‘yes’ and ‘no’ by taking majority voting and dis-
carding 7 users who were majority ‘unsure,’ our
best model achieves 72.4% accuracy on the test set
with simple weighting, window size 5, and thresh-
old of 0.35.
C Model Training Details
Our name model uses a CNN implementation re-
leased in Wood-Doughty et al. (2018). We use a
CNN with 256 filters of width 3. The user’s name
(not screen name) is truncated at 50 characters and
embedded into a 256 dimensional character em-
bedding. We fine-tuned the learning rate on our
dev data, trained for 250 epochs, and used early-
stopping on dev-set F1 to pick which model to
evaluate on the test set.
Our unigram model follows
Volkova and Bachrach (2015), using a simple
sparse logistic regression. We use an implementa-
tion from Scikit-Learn, and tune the regularization
parameter on the dev set. We introduce a hyper-
parameter to down-weight the contribution of our
users compared to the baseline users; we also set
that parameter on the dev set.
D Rebalancing Algorithm
All Twitter demographics datasets considered in
this and previous work, unless they were ex-
Imbalanced, per-class Balanced, per-class
Method W B H/L A W B H/L A
Random 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Majority 100. - - - 100. - - -
Crowd 98.3 34.4 5.9 - 95.6 49.6 - -
QB 99.3 35.6 - - 66.4 86.7 - 4.4
Crowd+QB 98.4 40.1 2.0 - 29.2 95.6 5.3 3.5
HF 99.1 38.8 - - 39.8 93.8 - 8.9
Crowd+HF 99.3 33.1 - - 77.0 78.8 - -
CB 96.8 39.1 4.4 6.2 32.7 86.7 48.7 12.4
Crowd+CB 97.7 41.6 5.9 8.0 62.8 75.2 41.6 8.0
(a) Class-specific accuracy for unigram models. Dashes indicate 0% accuracy.
In imbalanced training settings, the models mostly ignore the smaller classes.
Names Unigrams
F1 Acc % F1 Acc %
.250 25.0 .250 25.0
.224 80.8 .224 80.8
.272 74.4 .396 83.3
.342 72.6 .350 75.6
.313 69.5 .426 81.8
.335 64.3 .345 75.6
.198 54.0 .406 79.6
.299 48.2 .304 43.8
.250 35.8 .456 76.8
(b) Imbalanced task prediction with-
out rebalancing. Accuracy always de-
creases; F1 sometimes increases.
Table 8: Additional model evaluations.
plicitly class-balanced, have major class imbal-
ances. This creates challenges when train-
ing on a dataset with one label distribution
and then evaluating on a dataset with a differ-
ent distribution. Variations of this challenge
have been widely studied (Lemaıˆtre et al., 2017;
Nikulin and McLachlan, 2009). To address this,
after training our classifier we explicitly calculate
its per-class recall on the development set. Then
we adjust per-class thresholds to maximize overall
accuracy given the label distribution of the dev or
test set. Explicit details are in our released code.
Table 8b below shows that without our rebal-
ancing approach, the accuracy of all trained mod-
els decreases, irrespective of the data on which
they were trained. However, the F1 score of some
models increases compared to the trained models
which were rebalanced to target an imbalanced test
set, because the model will make more predictions
for low-probability labels.
Using this method at test time requires prior
knowledge on the cumulative label distribution
which in many cases may be known due to
high-level survey data (Wojcik and Hughes, 2019),
even when nothing is known about individuals in
an dataset of interest. When we have no informa-
tion on the true label distribution, this approach
could be replaced with a more flexible Bayesian
method, or we could abandon the rebalancing al-
gorithm to avoid introducing any bias.
